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It is now more than ten years since the publication of
Kydland andPrescott'sfirst paperon real business cycles
(RBC). RBC theories rationalize fluctuations in key real
macro variables as the naturaloutcome ofthe competitive
economy where individuals make optimal, intertemporal
resource allocation decisions in response to stochastic
shifts in the production technology. We use a simple model
to bring out the salientfeatures ofthis methodology and
present a selective survey ofwork in this area over the
last decade.
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It is now more than ten years since the publication of
Kydlandand Prescott's first paperonrealbusiness cycles. I
Their early work has stimulated an impressive body of
research. This paper presents a selective survey of the
developments in this field over this period.
There can be different ways of describing the distin-
guishing tenets ofreal business cycle (RBC) theories. For
instance, Stockman (1988, p. 24) says, "thepurposeofreal
business cycle (RBC) models is to explain aggregate
fluctuations in business cycles without reference to mone-
tary policy." Perhaps more fundamentally, it is the follow-
ing central implication ofRBC theories that has attracted
attention: Fluctuations in aggregate output, as well as
employment, are not a manifestation ofcoordination fail-
ure in some markets, but a natural outcome ofthe competi-
tive economy where rational individuals make optimal,
intertemporal resource allocation decisions in response to
stochastic shifts in the production function.
Another aspect ofthese models is the fact that they are
dynamic, general equilibrium models ofthe economy, and
they generate empirical predictions for a wide array of
macroeconomic variables. This is in contrast to most
earlier analyses, which focused upon describing the be-
havior ofa subset ofthe economy. Thus, these models aim
to fulfill Lucas's (1977) requirement for understanding
business cycles: "One exhibits understanding ofbusiness
cycles by constructing a model in the most literal sense: a
fully articulated artificial economy which behaves through
time so as to imitate closely the time series behavior of
actual economics" [sic) (p. 11).
In a sense, RBC models are the descendants of the
models of Lucas (1975) and Barro (1976). Elements that
are common to these models include the role ofintertem-
poral substitution, the emphasis on individual optimiza-
tion, as well as the requirement that markets clear-inthe
sense that no unexploited gains from trade are permitted.
These elements distinguish both kinds ofmodels from the
traditional Keynesian theories ofthe business cycle.
However, RBC models diverge sharply from Lucas-
Barro type models when it comes to the sources ofmacro-
3economic fluctuations. Whereas the earliermodels focused
onthe role ofmonetary shocks in causing business cycles,
RBC models assign the primary role to shocks to produc-
tion technology. It is this combination of assumptions
about the economy's structure (i.e., optimizing individ-
uals, perfect competition, and clearing markets) and the
source of shocks (primarily, shocks to technology) that
suggests that macroeconomic fluctuations represent opti-
mal responses, and-in the absence ofexternalities-also
makes itdifficult to seehow stabilization policy canleadto
improvements in welfare.
RBC models also differ from the business cycle models
of Lucas and Barro in the production technology they
assume. Specifically, these models employ the production
structure contained in the Solow growth model. However,
the fact that these models allow endogenous saving and
labor supply decisions places fewer restnctlOns upon
the dynamic behavior of key macroeconomic variables
(such as income, investment, etc.) than traditional growth
models do, and therefore allows us to study business-
cycle-like movements in this artificial economy.
This paper is organized as follows. Section I lays out a
simple, intertemporal model to illustrate the key elements
of an RBC model. This model is then solved and the
solutions used to derive relationships between different
variables. The next section discusses how the predictions
from an artificial RBC economy are compared to the data
and how well these models perform. Section III surveys
research aimed at incorporating money into these models.
Section IV reviews some of the criticisms made against
these models, while the last section offers an appraisal and
some concluding comments.
1.
Here WI is the wage rate and r1 is the capital rental rate.
Equation (2) states that the sum of the individual's con-
sumption and investment(orsaving) mustequal the sumof
her income from labor and capital. Equation (3) simply
normalizes total hours to equal l.
The individual does not invest in capital fonnation in
period 2. However, she still has to make the leisure-labor




where Cj and ljdenoteconsumptionand leisurein period i. 2
For simplicity we assume that 'Y = I, so that the utility
function becomes
described by
I. A Simple Intertemporal Model
We will analyze a simple two-period model, where Equations (2) and (3) embody these decisions and the
many agents with identical preferences and endowments relevant constraints on each set of decisions:
reside in the economy. This makes the economy-wide
equilibrium outcome exactly the same as that for the
individual, and allows us to analyze the behavior of
the economy in terms of the behavior of a representative
agent. Assume that each individual's preferences can be
where A> o. Each individual makes allocation decisions




The evolution ofthe individual's capital stock from period
I to 2 is given by
where 8 denotes the depreciation rate for one period. For
simplicity, we assume that capital is used up each period,
so 8 is set to one. Consequently, i1 = k2 in our model.
Consumers make allocation decisions to maximize (1)'
subject to the constraints (2)-(6). This will give rise to the
following set of equations that describe the necessary
conditions for the consumer's optimum:
(6)
(1)'
where f3 is the rate at which individuals discount tomor-
row's utility. For simplicity, we set f3 = 1below.
We assume that each individual begins period 1with an
endowment of k1 units of capital. Each individual has to
choose how much to consume and invest (c1 , i1), and how
much time to spend in leisure or work (l1' n1). These
decisions will depend on the prices ofleisure (that is, the
wage rate) and rental capital, determined in the factor
market and taken as given by individuals in the economy.
(1)
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nl = D I {2 + A(l
CI = D I (D 2 + Z2 I)
1
(11) i l = k2 "2 (D2 Z2 1)
n2 = D I {2 + A(l - Z2D2)}
For the next stage we exploit the structure ofthe model
economy. First, the constant returns to scale technology
and perfect competition assumptions imply that factor
prices will be set equal to marginal products. Thus, in our
simple model, we will obtain Wi = 1 and ri = Zi' for
i 1, 2.
These conditions, together with the first order condi-
tions above (equation (7», imply certain specific relation-
ships between the decision variables (thatis, CI , nl , ii'
etc). Thus, we obtain
where D I 1/2(1 + A) and D 2 = (1 + kl ZI)' We now
use our model and these results to discuss some ofthe key
issues in the RBC literature.
for i = 1,2.
The first equation shows the equilibrium tradeoff between
consumption today and tomorrow. It states that in equi-
librium the marginal utility of $1 of consumption today
must equal the marginal utility of $r2 of consumption
tomorrow. Similarly, (lOb) presents the equilibrium trade-
off between consumption and leisure. This tradeoff is
determined by the parameter A, which represents the
utility derived from leisure relative to that derived from
consumption. The equation shows that at the optimum the
individual equates the marginal utility of consumption
with the marginal utility of leisure.
Then, we impose the market clearing conditions. Spe-
cifically, in equilibrium the demands for labor and capital
will equal the respective supplies (i.e., N = nandK = k),
and total output will be exhausted (i.e.,y = c + k). As a
result, we obtain a system ofequations that describes the
evolution ofthe equilibrium values over time:
Intertemporal Choices
The intertemporal nature ofthe decision is immediately
clearin (11). The equilibrium outcome ofthe first period is
directly dependent on the state of the economy in the
- Al + r2 A 2 = 0





- w2 A2 = 0
Here A!, 1..2 are Lagrange multipliers associated with
constraints (2) and (4), respectively, and measure the
shadow price ofconsumption in the two periods.
Assume that there are as many firms as individuals.
Each firm maximizes one-period profit, given by
(8)
- I
Y = [u1N-P + u 2(Kz)-P] P
where the good Ycaneitherbeconsumedorinvested. Here
U I and U 2 arethe respective shares oflaborand capital, and
p is the elasticity ofsubstitution between the two. The Zjs
denote capital specific technology shocks. For simplicity
again, we assume that U I = U 2 = - P = 1, so that the
production function becomes
We further assume that there is no uncertainty in this
economy, so that ZI and Z2 are known when agents make
decisions at the beginning of period 1.4
Given this structure for the economy, our aimis to derive
a system ofequations that expresses the endogenous vari-
ables as functions ofthe exogenous technology shocks and
predetermined capital stock variables that describe the
state of the economy. Solving the first order conditions
(equation (7») will give rise to individual decision rules
that relate individual consumption-saving and leisure-
labor decisions to the set of variables that are taken to be
exogenous toan individualconsumer, such as the wage and
capital rental rates for both periods and aggregate capital
stocks in each period.
(9)
where Y denotes the firm's output, while N and K respec-
tively denote the labor and capital employed by the firm.
Firms are assumed to employ input factors in competitive
factor markets, so that factor prices (measured here in
terms ofoutput) are taken as given. These firms employ an
identical production technology given by the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) function
(7)







The equations show that output in the two periods reacts
differently to each shock, that is to say, ay\/aZi =1= ay2/ azi ,
for i = 1, 2. So, output in our model economy will
fluctuate overthe two periods, where theparticularshape is
determined by the realizations of the exogenous technol-
ogy shocks in both periods. Notice that the differential
response of output over the two periods is perfectly com-
patible with the fully informed, optimizing behavior of
agents in the economy. In the context of our model,
and
Fluctuations in Output
When the solutions for n1 ' n2 , and i1 (shown in (ll» are
substituted into (8), we can write equilibrium outputs of
periods one and two (Y\, Y2 ) as functions of the state
variables.5 Differentiating these expressions leads to
aYl -a = (2 + A)D\k1
Z\
the wage rate. This is because an increase in the productiv-
ity oftomorrow's capital stock makes it desirable to have a
larger capital stock tomorrow. One way to increase tomor-
row's capital stock is to increase work effort and produce
more today, so that more can be invested.
The other way is to reduce consumption today, since the






Thus, an increase in the productivity oftomorrow's capital
stock leads to increased investment today; this higher
investment is obtained by reducing consumption and by
increasing work effort.
Thus, changes in intertemporal opportunities cause in-
dividuals to alter both consumption and leisure. These
intertemporal considerations remain central as the time
horizon is extendedfrom oursimpletwo-period framework




= D\k\Z2 > O.
aZl
Theeffect ofanincreasein Z2' however, isquite different
from that of an increase in z\. Again from (11)
anI AD 1 >0 aZ2 Z~
an2
aZ2
Thus, a large Z2 unambiguously lowers n2 because of the
wealth effect. However, it has the opposite effect on n1•
Note that this change in n\ occurs without any change in
Recall that the Zjs affect the productivity ofcapital (and in
equilibrium equal the real interest rate). Further, since the
productivity of capital is independent of labor supply, a
higher Zl is equivalent to getting a larger endowment of
capital in the first period. In other words, an increase in Zl
has a pure wealth effect. Theory tells us that individuals
shouldreact by reducing labor supply in both periods. (l2)
shows that a large realization of Zl unambiguously lowers
n1• It will also lower n2 as long as Z2 is positive, a
requirement that does not seem too stringent when it is
recalled that Z2 (=r2) is the gross rate of return on
investing in the first period.
Higher wealth should also imply an increase in con-
sumption. In ourmodel, (lOa) shows that any change in the
equilibrium level ofleisure (and hence labor supply) must
be accompanied by a change in consumption. This can be
confirmed from (ll) as well
aCl
aZ l
second period, and vice versa. The reason for these in-
tertemporal linkages is easily seen from (lOa). Because
the individual equates the marginal utility ofconsumption
in both time periods, any change in consumption (or
in consumption possibilities) in one period will also af-
fect consumption in the second. For similar reasons, any
changein.leisure in one periodwill also leadto achange in
leisure in the next period.
It is easiest to understand the adjustments taking place
by examining how individuals react to the two technology
shocks in the model. Consider first the response to a





6 Economic Review / Spring 1991attempts to offsetthis response (thatis, attempts to "stabil-
ize" output) will have adverse welfare consequences. That
is because the fluctuations in output are the result of
individuals' utility maximizing decisions about consump-
tion and leisure over time, and attempts to alter these
decisions will only force individuals to make choices that
were initially rejected as being less desirable.
Consumption and Investment Volatility
Since no investmenttakes place in the secondperiod, we
will examine the consumption-investment (savings) deci-
sion ofthe first period to see what ourmodel says about the




11\ z2(l + k1z l ) + 1
- = >1.
111 z2(1 + k1z l ) - 1
Carrying out the same exercise with respect to Z2 also
leads to:
These semi-elasticities measure how much individuals
modify their optimal consumption-saving allocations in
response to a productivity shock either today or in the
future. These results show that investment will be more
responsive to external shocks than consumption in this
economy, as long as Z2 is no smallerthan 1. (This restriction
implies that in the worst states ofthe world the decision to
invest is equivalent to a decision to hold nonproductive
inventories, since firms always get back what they invest.)
The investment series will continue to be more volatile
than the consumption series over time when the time
horizon is extended in our economy.
The fundamental reason that consumption is less vol-
atilethan investmentcanbefound inthe basicpropertiesof
the utility function that describes preferences in ourmodel
economy. The specification of the utility function (1) im-
plies that a typical person in the model economy does not
regard. consumption in different periods (periods one and
two) as perfect substitutes. In other words, the individual
wants to consume in both periods. Ifthis were not the case,
a small change in the relative advantage to consuming in
any period would lead the individual to switch all con-
sumption to that period.6 One response to this desire to
smooth consumption would be to smooth production as
well. However, the returns to production, and to the
ownership ofcapital, can vary widely over time, so invest-
ment will tend to be more volatile.
The mechanics ofthis argument are best understood in
terms of the model discussed above. Consider, first, an
increase in ZI' Recall that this implies an increase in
wealth. The individual's response is to work less and
consume more in both periods. However, the direct effect
of working less in the second period would be to reduce
second period output and, therefore, second period con-
sumption. Consequently, in order to smooth consumption
the individual must raise investment in period 1 by more
than the change in consumption.
An increase in Z2 represents an increase in the rate of
return on capital in the second period. As discussed above,
individuals react to this increase by raising labor supply
today and lowering consumption. So, period 1output goes
up while consumption declines, that is to say, investment
rises by more than the fall in consumption.
Our finding that investment is more volatile than con-
sumption is one ofthe widely recognized key stylizedfacts
ofthe U.S. andothereconomies, and, as we discuss below,
has been replicated by many different RBC models.
As shown above, the pattern of output in our simple
model depends upon the technology shocks in each ofthe
two periods. In a more sophisticated multi-period model,
typically used in such work, one can observe distinct
cyclical fluctuations whose general characteristics will
depend on the structure of the technology shock process,
which is the primary source of exogenous impulses. A
The Methodology
II. Matching the Model with the Data
model builder can then obtain a set of descriptive statis-
tics on artificial time series generated by simulating this
model. These statistics can then be used to examine the
explanatory power of a model, not only in terms of the
qualitative implications, but also in terms of quantitative
similarity to the actual time series data.
In practice, this methodology is implemented in the
following way. First, one choosesexplicit specifications for
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 7the preferences of consumers, the aggregate production
technology, and an exogenous impulse generating mecha-
nism. For example, the researcher may decide that the
Cobb-Douglas function is a good representation of the
production technology or that the stochastic process for
technology shocks is well described as a first order auto-
regression. Second, the artificial economy is calibrated,
that is to say, the researcher chooses specific parameter
values for the functional forms she has selected. For
instance, ifthe researcherwere to employ the CRRAutility
function described above, she would have to choose values
for'Y andA. Similarly, the values for the parameters ofthe
production function (<Xl and <Xzin ourexample above) also
have to be estimated. Typically, some of these values are
drawn from various micro and macro studies; for example,
the parameters measuring the degree of risk aversion, as
well as the shares of labor and capital in the aggregate
production function are obtained in this way. Values for
other parameters are obtained by imposing the condition
that the model's steady state implications are similar to
long-run observations for the U.S. economy. This includes,
for example, the average proportion of time devoted to
leisure and to work, the inter-temporal discountfactor (~in
our model), etc.
Next, the model economy is solved for an equilibrium,
and decision rules for the representative individual are
obtained. These rules specify individual behavior as func-
tions of state variables (such as the capital stock carried
over from the last period) and the exogenous shocks. For
our simple model, equation (11) presents the relevant
decision rules. The capital stock does not show up in (11)
because of our assumption of 100 percent depreciation.
Before going further, it also is worth pointing out that only
a certain limited class ofspecifications for preferences and
technology allow one to obtain a closed form, or an
analytical solution. Consequently, some type of approx-
imation procedure is usually adopted in practice. 7
Armed with these decision rules, we are now ready to
face the critical test: how well does the model economy
mimic the real one? Answering this question involves
using the model economy to generate artificial data. Since
the model is driven by random shocks, this involves
repeated draws from the probability distribution specified
for the technology shock process. This artificially gener-
ated data is then compared to data for the US. economy.
Prior to making such a comparison, the data need to be
transformedto make them stationary. One way to do so is to
use the method employed by Kydland and Prescott (1982),
and to apply a filter proposed by Hodrick and Prescott
(1980) to both the actual and artificial data. The usual
8
practice then is to summarize the detrended data in terms
ofits second moments (such as the standard deviations and
correlationcoefficients), and to comparethese statistics on
the artificial economy with the corresponding statistics for
the US. economy.
The Comparison
Table 1 presents one such example, reproduced from
Kydland and Prescott (1982).8 Notice that the standard
deviation of output in the model economy is exactly the
same as in the U.S. economy. This is by construction.
Specifically, as part of the calibration process, the size of
the technology shock in the model economy is chosen to
obtain this result. This does not restrict the other variables
in the model economy to behave in the same way as they do
in the US. economy, and a comparison of these variances
and covariances provides a way of judging the model's
adequacy. This is because the relative behavior ofdifferent
variables also is a function of the model's structure-its
propagation mechanism-and does not depend only upon
the kind of exogenous shock process that is employed.
Later, we will discuss how altering the nature of the
technology shock process alters the behavior ofthe model.
As Kydland and Prescott point out, the model captures
the relative size ofthe fluctuations in output, consumption,
and investment. Thus, investment is substantially more
volatile than income in both the US. and the model
economies, while consumption is less volatile. Recall that
our simple model also leads to the result that investment is
more volatile than consumption. In addition, the Kydland-
Prescott model also captures the strong, positive correla-
tion between these variables and output.
Economic Review / Spring 1991Obviously, the model does not provide a "perfect fit."
For example, both consumption and labor hours are only
halfas volatile in the modeleconomy as they arein the U.S.
economy. Ofthe two, attention has focused upon "fixing"
the problem with labor hours. Kydland and Prescott at-
temptedto raise the variability oflaborhours intheir model
economy by increasing the substitutability of leisure in
different periods. The results of this attempt are already
incorporated in Table 1; obviously, their attempt was not
completely successful.
Anumberofsubsequentpapersalso have focused onthis
problem. Kydland (1984) assumes that there were two
different kinds of workers-differentiated on the basis of
work skills-and shows that this led to greater variability
in labor hours than the homogeneous labor case. Using a
suggestion by Rogerson, Hansen (1985) shows that indi-
visibility oflaborcould be the reason for the relatively high
variability of labor hours. Allowing for indivisible labor,
Hansen shows that in his model economy the standard
deviation oflabor hours was roughly 80 percent of that in
the data for the U.S. economy (compared to the ratio of50
percent shown in Table 1). Cho and Rogerson (1988) allow
for heterogenous labor(orhouseholdproduction) and show
that in their model economy total hours are roughly 10
percent more variable than in the U.S. economy (over the
1955-1984 period).
While these attempts have been focused on making the
model economy match the "stylized facts," other econo-
mists have directed their efforts towards a closerexamina-
tion of the stylized facts themselves. Singleton (1988)
argues that since traditionally defined seasonal, cyclical,
and secular components of time series have common
determinants, prefiltering the data leads to a violation of
the restrictions imposed by the theory. Consequently, the
results are likely to be functions of the method used to
prefilter the data. Using a bivariate Vector Autoregression
of real wages and hours worked, he shows that Granger
causality tests as well as variance decompositions are
sensitive both to whether the data is seasonally adjusted
and to the treatment of the secular component. He also
points outthat the filter used byKydlandandPrescottleads
to results similar to those obtained after the data is first
differenced.
King, J;>losser, and Rebelo (1988, p. 225; hereafter KPR)
also point out that the "stylized facts" about the U.S.
economy are sensitive to how the data is detrended. Since
". . . the basic neoclassical model has implications for
untransformed macroeconomic dataand not some arbitrary
or prespecified transformation or component that is de-
fined outside the contextofthe model," they argue that the
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco
procedure employed to detrend the data should be consis-
tent with the theoretical model. KPR work with a model
in which deterministic labor-augmenting technological
change is the engine ofgrowth, and in which technological
change itself takes place according to a log linear trend.
Consequently, they study deviations of the log levels of
output,consumption, and investment from a common
lineartrend. Laborhours are not detrended since they show
no trend.
When post-war U.S. output (for the 1948-1986 sample
period) is detrended this way the standard deviation of
labor hours is only half as much as that of output, in
contrast to the nearly equal standard deviations obtained
after the Hodrick-Prescott filter is used (see Table 1). Thus,
theevidence on the relative variabilityoflaborhours seems
sensitive to the detrending procedure employed.9
The Role ofthe Technology Shock Specification
The specification of the technology shock process is
obviously a central issue. KPR examine how the behavior
of the model economy changes in response to changes in
the technology shock process. They find that ifthe technol-
ogy shock is not serially correlated there is no serial
correlation in output, investment, or labor hours, while
consumption, wages, and the real interest rate continue to
be serially correlated. Thus, fluctuations in output appear
to reflect fluctuations in the technology shock process. In
addition, the degree ofpersistenceofthe technology shock
affects the relative volatility of different variables. For
instance, more persistent technology shocks reduce the
variability of labor hours. Highly persistent shocks imply
that the return to working in adjacent (or nearby) periods is
roughly the same, so the intertemporal substitution oflabor
becomes less desirable.
Do technology shocks in fact follow the kind ofprocess
required by RBC models to mimic key features ofthe U.S.
economy? The problem here is that we do not directly
observe the process governing the evolution oftechnology.
To get around this problem, Prescott (1986, p. 25) sug-
gests, "One method ofmeasuring technological change is
to follow Solow (1957) and define it as the changes in
output less the sum of the changes in labor's input times
labor share and the changes in capital input times capital
share. Measuring variables in logs, this is the percentage
change in the technology parameter of the Cobb-Douglas
production function." After examining data on the U.S.
economy for the 1955-1984 period he concludes that the
process governing the change in technology is close to a
random walk with drift, and so is consistent with the
technology shock process assumed in RBC models. 1O
I)Accepting the Solow residuals as an appropriate meas-
ure oftechnological shocks to the U.S. economy gives us
anadditional dimension for judging the performance ofthe
RBC model. Recall that Kydland and Prescott (1982)
chose the size of the technology shock to match the
standard deviation of output. If the measured Solow re-
siduals are used as exogenous technological shocks in-
stead, the model's prediction of the standard deviation of
real output can be compared to that of the U.S. economy.
Kydland and Prescott (1989) do exactly that, and conclude
thatabout 70percentofU.S. post-warcyclicalfluctuations
are induced by variations in the Solow technology param-
eter. 11 A similar strategy is followed by Plosser (1989),
who inputs the measured Solow residual for the U.S.
eCOl1omy{overthe 1954-1985 period) into aRBCmodel. In
contrast to th~ Kydland and Prescott method oflooking at
the second moments of the data, this procedure leads to
simulated time series for the major economic variables
(such as output, consumption, etc.) that can be compared
directlyto data for the U.S. economy. Plosser finds that the
simulated data are close to the actual data, with the
coqelations between the two ranging from .52 to .87 for
different sel'ies. However, .these papers do not provide a
formalmeans ofjudginghow close the predictedvalues are
compared to the actual values. We will return to these
issues inSection IV.
III. What Does Money 00712
The RBC models that we have surveyed above have
shown that it is possible to have economies display busi-
ness cycle-like behavior without reference to money. This
is in marked contrast to more traditional analyses, such as
Friedman and Schwartz (1982), Lucas (1975) and Barro
(1976), which assign an important role to monetary dis-
turbances. Indeed, some have argued that this is the
distinguishing feature ofRBC models (as we point out in
the introduction).
It is also possible to assert that some form ofmonetary
neutrality is assumed implicitlyinRBC analysis. However,
to regard monetary neutrality as the only defining tenet of
RBC theories would be similar to claiming that most
papers in public finance are studies ofmonetary neutrality
because they fail to include money in the models. It seems
more likely that the omission ofmoney orfinancial market
variables reflects the fact that early contributors were more
concerned with explaining the non-monetary characteris-
tics of business cycles. For instance, KPR (1988, p. 196)
stress that it is necessary first to understand the effects of
real disturbances, and that, "Without an understanding of
these real fluctuations it is difficult a priori to assign an
important role to money." 13
Indeed, more recent research in this field focuses on the
issues related to monetary aspects of the aggregate econ-
omy. Since they are "fully articulated" economies, it is
necessary to motivate the use ofmoney in these models by
explicitly specifying some kindoftransactions technology.
Below, we discuss the two alternative mechanisms that
have commonly been used in these analyses: the cash-
in-advance constraint and the shopping-time technology
specification (or a household production technology). A
series of related questions can be asked once money is
introduced into an RBC model. How successful are these
10
models.in ~xplaining the observed correlations among
output, money, and otherreal andnominal variables? What
is the nature of the causal link between fluctuations in
money and output? Alternatively, does the inclusion of
money improve our ability to explain business cycles?
One way ofintroducing money in an RBC economy is to
model it as an input into the transactions technology. King
and Plosser (1984) and Kydland (1989) adopt a shopping-
time technology to model the transactions role of money.
Specifically, they assume that the timerequired to carry out
transactions varies inversely with the amount of money
h~ld. Huh (1990) adopts a household production technol-
ogy whiC;h requires the use of both physical output and
money to gen~rate actual consumption for consumers. 14
King anq Plosser (1984) focused on explaining the
procyclical correlation betweenoutput and the broad mon-
etary aggregates (such as MI) that has beenobserved in the
U.S. economy. They introduce separate competitive firms
(banks) that produce transactions services. These services
artdemande<.i bybothhouseholds (because ofthe shopping
time t~chn?logy) and firms (as an input to the production
prOC;~ss). Thus, .banks will increase the supply of transac-
tions s~rvices response to a favorable technology shock
to.thefinal-goo<.i-producing firms to meet the increased
de1lll}nd of bpth the firms and consumers. Consumer
demand for transactions services goes up because the
0pp9rtunitycostofleisure time, as well as the val~e oftime
t~tn up.byshopping activities, has gone up due to an
increase in the real wage rate. Thus, the King-Plosser
model predicts the observed positive correlation between
output ~lllq insid~ Iiloney. However, it is important to note
that th~ causal relationship between the two is the reverse
of what is traditionally assumed-an inc;rease in output
leads to an increase in the money stock, and not vice versa.
Economic Review I Spring1991The price level is determined in the marketfor government
issued currency, which is demanded by households as a
substitute for transactions services supplied by financial
intermediaries.
The King-Plosser paper emphasized establishing a
plausible theoretical construct that gave rise to reverse
causation, and the quantitative analysis characteristic of
RBC analysis was not carried out. To carry out such an
analysis one needs to calibrate the transactions technology
explicitly based on empirical studies of individual or
household behavior with respect to money holdings and
purchasing patterns. This way of modeling provides a
practicalroute thatcanpotentiallycaptureandmeasure the
role ofmoney as a medium ofexchange in a real economy.
This also willimposeempiricaldisciplineon studies ofthe
monetary aspect of an economy, similar to that found in
other RBC analyses. IS
Kydland (1989) examines the implications of allowing
the possibility ofa tradeoffbetween leisure and money as
envisioned in a shopping time technology. One interesting
finding is that the price level ofthe model economy turns
out to be halfas variable as the CPI ofthe U.S. economy,
even with a constantmoney stock assumption. These price
level fluctuations in the model economy are due to shifts in
the demand for real balances which, in turn, vary entirely
due to the desire of agents in the economy to substitute
leisure (or labor) over time. The price level also exhibits a
negative contemporaneous correlation with output in this
economy, a feature thatbothCooley andHansen(1989) and
Kydland and Prescott (1990) also find in post-war U.S.
data. However, Kydland finds that introducing money in
this way does not change the behavior ofeither output or
labor supply in the model economy.
Huh(1990) obtains amore comprehensiveaccountingof
the pattern ofcomovements among output, money stock,
and price level observed in the U.S. time series data. Huh
adopts a household production specificationofdemand for
money, which requires the use ofboth physical output and
money as input factors in generating actual consumption.
The money supply of the model economy each period is
determined by an explicit monetary reaction function,
which depends upon both lagged real shocks and past
values of money growth. Given this specification, the
model economy exhibits a spurious positive comovement
between money and output that approximates the positive
correlation observed in U.S. time series data on the two
variables. Variations in the steady state rate of inflation
turn out to have real effects in this economy.l6 However,
changes in the money supply do not seem to be an impor-
tant source ofbusiness cycle movements.
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Huh partially exploits the added opportunity of impos-
ingempirical discipline that was discussed earlier. For
example, the paper uses information about the relative
variability of a·broader measure of monetary aggregates
(Ml) overa narrowly measured one (monetary base) in
calibrating the money supplyfunction. Butnocomparable
procedure was implemented with regard to the transaction
technology calibration.
The other specification that has been employedin these
models is thecash-in-advance (or liquidity) constraint,
wnich motivates the introduction of money by simply
requiringtheuseofmoney inmakingtransactions. Various
economic implications of the cash-in-advance constraint
have been extensively studied in monetary economics (for
example, see Lucas (1980), Lucas and Stokey (1987),
Stockman (1981». Cooley and Hansen (1989) apply this
liquidityconstraintto the RBC economyofHansen (1985).
In the Cooley-Hansen economy, goods can be divided
intotwo groups: cashgoods andnoncash goods, depending
on whether the purchase ofa good requires the use ofcash
(e.g., consumption) or not (e.g., leisure). Money is non-
neutral because anticipated changes in money affect the
relative price of consumption (cash good) and leisure
(noncash good). Cooley and Hansen found the steady state
welfare cost ofinflation to be nontrivial in their economy.
However, variations in the money supply do not have much
impactonthe cyclicalbehaviorofthe real variables intheir
model either. I? The authors speculate that money may have
alargerroleto play in amodel withrestrictions onavailable
information similar to those in Lucas (1972).18
Kydland(1989) carries outsuchanexercise. To measure
the·informational impact in isolation, Kydland adopts a
version of the model economy of Lucas (1972) which is
populated by spatially separated agents. The information
structure assumed by Kydland implies that agents must
extract information about the real wage from observations
ontnenominal wage. Monetary shocks alterthe pricelevel,
thereby complicating the agent's signal extraction prob-
lem. However, itturns outthat variations inthe growth rate
ofmoney do not lead to significant cyclical movements in
this model either.19
Overall, these (ongoing) efforts to extend standardRBC
research to allow a role for money have produced interest-
ing results. These studies provide a positive answer to the
questionofwhetherthere existplausible specificationsthat
can explain (in the sense of Lucas (1977» a set of key
observations on nominal quantities and prices. However,
theans\Verto the question ofwhether these specifications
of money are an exhaustive and sufficiently robust map-
pingohheroleofmoney inthe "real" economy seems less
11clear. Thus far, for example, no studies based on the RBC
premises have shed light on the effects of open market
operations involving different types of instruments of
government indebtedness.2o Another potential source of
nonneutral money is some form of a nominal contractual
arrangement.21 Consequently, it seems inappropriate to
interpret the results ofthese studies as demonstrating that
money has no role to play in causing business cycles.
IV. What the Critics Say
The developments in RBC theory surveyed above repre-
sent innovations both in terms oftechnique and in ways of
thinking about business cycles. However, that does not
imply that RBC theory is free from shortcomings. In this
section we review some of the criticisms leveled against
this approach. We begin by reviewing what critics have to
say in three broad areas. First, economists have expressed
concern about a key propagation mechanism in these
models, namely, the intertemporal substitution of leisure.
Second, they have criticized the theory's reliance upon
technology shocks. And third, they have also questioned
the method by which parameter estimates have been ob-
tained, that is to say, they have questioned the technique of
"calibration." We conclude the section by summarizing
some additional criticisms ofthe theory.
As discussed above, this approach relies upon intertem-
poral substitution of leisure to generate business cycles.
This reliance has been criticized on several grounds. For
instance, Walsh (1986) points out that while labor supply is
procyclical, most of the cyclical variation in employment
is accounted for by changes in the employment rate, rather
than by changes in the labor force as the theory would
predict. Since recessions are periods of low return, the
theory also predicts that the quit rate should be counter-
cyclical, whereas the data show that the quit rate is
procyclical.
In addition to concerns about the mechanism generating
business cycles, questions have also been raised about the
nature and role of the technology shocks. For instance,
Summers (1986) wonders where the technology shocks are,
and whether recessions should be defined as periods of
technl[)loglcal regress. A similar sentiment is expressed by
Mankiw (1989, p. 85): "Theexistence oflargefluctuations
in the available technology is a crucial but unjustified
assumption of real business cycle theory."
Over the postwar period, probably the most prominent
aggregate shocks have been the changes in the relative
price of oil. Since oil is a major input, variations in its
relative price are likely to have a measurable impact on
economy-wide output. However, in arecent study, Kimand
Loungani (unpublished, p. 18) find that"... the inclusion
of energy price shocks leads to only a modest reduction
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in. the RBC model's reliance on unobserved technology
shocks."
It is also possible that the economy-wide technology
shocks represent the aggregation of a large number of
shocks to different industries. However, this notion is
questioned by McCallum (1989, p. 29), who states that if
th~term. technology shockis ". . . . taken literally to refer
to shifts in the state-of-knowledge technological relation-
ship betweeninputs and outputs, then itwould seem highly
unlik~ly that there could exist any substantial aggregate
variability." This is because the economy contains a large
number of different sectors employing different technol-
ogies, and shocks to these technologies should be more or
less independent. Since the economy-wide technology
shock would be an average of these industry-specific
shocks, it would evolve more smoothly than what RBC
models seem to require.
Prescott's use ofthe Solow residual to measure the size
of the technology shock has also been criticized. Recall
that the Solow residual is obtained as a residual from a
(Cobb-Douglas) production function using laborand capi-
tal as inputs. This proGedure implies that errors in the
measurement of labor and capital will show up as varia-
tions ill the ~stimated Solow residual (since the errors in
measuring output are likely to be uncorrelated with the
errors in measuring labor and capital). Consider, for exam-
ple, what happens when there are variations in the rate of
capital utilization. Since the measured Solow residual is
based upon an assumption of100 percent capacity utiliza-
tion, any change in the rate ofcapacity utilization will be
measured as a technology shock.22
Variations in"therate ofutilization" for the labor input
are likely to have similar effects. Eichenbaum (1990)
points out that allowing for labor hoarding in an RBC
model drastically reduces the role of technology shocks.
Thus, naive Solow residual accounting overestimates the
variance ofthe technology shocks.
McCallum (1989) also points out that the Solow residual
will overestimate the variance of the technology shock in
thepresenceofadjustmentcosts. (Adjustmentcosts can be
one reason for labor hoarding.) As evidence, he points to a
study byJorgenson and Griliches in which the elimination
Economic Review / Spring1991of aggregation errors and a correction for variations in
lahor and capital utilization reduces the role played by the
Solow residual (in explaining output growth) to only 7
percentofthe initial estimate.
A numberofothers have also expressed similarreserva-
tions about the use of the Solow residual to measure
technology shocks. According to Hall (1989), the Solow
residual is correlated with oil prices, military spending,
and even the political party of the president. Similarly,
Evans (1990) shows that the Solow residual is correlated
with alternative measures of the money supply. These
correlations contradict the assumption that the Solow re-
sidual only measures shifts in the production function.
Ifthe Solow residual is not a good measure of technol-
ogy shocks, what are we left with? RBC proponents have
notdone a goodjobofcoming up with alternatives, leaving
critics to wonder how the theory can be verified.
The next major criticism ofRBC models has to do with
the issue ofstatistical inference. The basic problem is that
the calibration techniques discussed above do not take
account of the uncertainty that exists regarding the true
value of the parameters. Thus, Manuelli and Sargent
(1988, p. 531) express concern about the use of out-of-
sample evidence to estimate parameters since it precludes
the use of a formal probability model to make judgments
about the results. They further ask "Does it matterhowthe
extraneous (out ofsample) parameter estimates have been
made? Were these estimates obtained using a theoretical
structure consistent with the general equilibrium structure
Kydland-Prescott maintain? Were the extraneous esti-
mates obtained in ways that would be statistically consis-
tent in view of the cross-equation and cross-frequency
restrictions imposedby the Kydland and Prescottmodel?"
In a similar vein, Eichenbaum (1990, p. 9) states
". . . calibrationexercises do not provide any information
onhowloudly the data speak on any given question." He
takesissue with Kydland and Prescott's contention that
technology shocks account for 70 percent ofthe business
cyclevariation in post-warU.S. output. Onthe basis ofhis
attempt to incorporate parameter uncertainty into mea-
surements ofthe role oftechnology shocks, he concludes
that". . . we ought to be very comfortable believing that
the modelexplainsanywhere between5% and200% ofthe
variance in per capita U.S. output." In other words, the
role of technology shocks is very imprecisely estimated.
A number ofother criticisms have also been made. For
example, some economists (Summers (1986), among oth-
ers) find a pervasive use of the "representative agent"
construct in RBC theories objectionable. In addition, the
model has only been tested on postwar U.S. data so far.
Critics have pointed out the need to test the model using
alternative samples. Rogoff (1986), for example, has sug-
gested estimating the model for different countries.
Ingram and Leeper (1990) argue that the use of RBC
models to examine policy issues may be subject to a
version ofthe Lucas critique. 23 This criticism is applicable
to models that use parameter values used in calibrating
early RBC models which ignored the effects of policy
(e.g., Kydland and Prescott 1982). Ingram and Leeper
show thatignoring the effects ofmonetarypolicyin a world
in which policy has real effects implies that some of the
estimated parameters will be reduced form coefficients.
Policy analyses based on the assumption that these are
deep, policy invariant parameters will, therefore, lead to
incorrect inferences.
V. An Appraisal
Clearly, RBC models are not without their critics.
Nevertheless, this line of inquiry has made important
contributions to economic analysis. RBCmodels represent
a significant innovation in economic modeling, since they
were the first operational models based upon microeco-
nomic foundations. As such, they provide a coherent,
logicallyconsistent way ofthinking about the macroecon-
omy. At one level, these models provide a useful counter-
point to the view that in the absence offiscal and monetary
policyshocks, real output wouldgrow at a steady 3percent
annual rate (or whatever the sample average growth rate
would happen to be).
One·attraction of these models is that they provide a
relatively straightforward way of testing theories against
FederalReserve Bank ofSan Francisco
data. However, existing RBC models are highly stylized
and do not have the same econometric detail as the large
scale Keynesian models often used for policy purposes.
So what can these models tell us about how to conduct
policy?KydlandandPrescott suggestthat we needto learn
more about business cycles before making policy recom-
mendations. For instance, in Kydland and Prescott (1988,
p. 358) they state, "Ouranalysis should not be interpreted
to mean that fluctuations are optimal and that there is no
role for stabilization policy. Ourview is thatpublic finance
considerations are not the principal factor driving the
business cycle and that abstracting from them at this stage
is warranted. Only when we have considerable confidence
in a theory ofbusiness fluctuations would the application
13ofpublic finance theory to the question ofstabilization be
warranted."
Their conclusion is based on a model that does not
explicitly incorporate either public spending or money.
What can we say on the basis of models that do? As
discussed above, changingeitherthe growth rate ofmoney
orthe sizeofthe monetary shocks in these models does not
have asignificanteffect on the cyclical behavior ofthe real
14
variables. On the surface, this seems to suggest that mone-
tarypolicyis not very important. However, existingmodels
are not yet rich enough to support such a conclusion. For
instance, these models allow only a limitedrole for money
and do not allow for .other nominal assets. Thus, the
available evidence does not seem sufficient (or·robust
enough) to convince a risk-averse policymaker either to
adopt or to abandon a specific course ofaction.
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1. Their first paper on this topic ("A Competitive Theory of
Fluctuations.. . ") was published in 1980, though Kyd-
landand Prescott (1982) is more frequently cited.
2. This function belongs tothe constant relative risk aver-
sion(CRRA) class. See Blanchard and Fischer(1989) for a
discussion.
3. A simpler production function does impose costs.For
instance, our specification implies a constant marginal
product of labor and consequently a constant wage rate.
4. For our purposes the important point isthatthe z;'s shift
the marginal product of capital.
5. In our specification, Y1 is not equal to Y 2 even in the
absence of shocks. However, this difference is not central
to our discussion, since our focus is on the change in
output in response to the technology shocks.
6. The elasticity of intertemporal substitution is a funda-
mental determinant of the volatility of consumption. For
example, if the utility function is linear in consumption, the
elasticity of the intertemporal substitution of consumption
becomes infinitely large. Since individuals do not care
about the period they consume in, consumption becomes
extremely volatile. To demonstrate this heuristically, sup-
pose that the two-period utility function is as follows:
-1
U(C1, C2) = [q-P + C2P] P ,
where Ci denotes consumption in period i for i = 1, 2. The
elasticity of substitution between c1 and C2 is given by
1/(1 + p), The utility function becomes linear when pis -1.
Note that the elasticity of substitution goes to infinity as p
approaches -1.
7. See Kydland and Prescott(1982), and King, Plosser
and Rebelo (1988) for two distinct solution procedures. A
comparison of alternative solution procedures is con-
tained in the JournalofBusiness andEconomic Statistics,
January 1990.
8. King and Plosser (1989) employ a different technique
to carry out tests of RBC models.
9. KPR also cite other work by King and Rebelo that
demonstrates that applying a low frequency filter (such as
first differences) to the data from a theoretical economy
raises the correlation between output and labor input.
10. Also see Kydland and Prescott (1988).
11. Their model is more general than the one discussed
above, since it allows labor input to change both in terms
of hours perworker and the number of employed workers.
12. As mentioned above, there are many extensions of the
basic Kydland-Prescott model that we do not cover in our
survey. For instance, Stockman (1988, 1990) deals with
open economyissues. Christiano and Eichenbaum (1988)
examine the effects of shocks to government spending in
an RBC model. Christiano (1988) introduces inventories.
13. A somewhat different view is expressed by Eichen-
baum and Singleton (1986, p. 92):
"In our view, proponents of real business cycle theories
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are not claiming that monetary policy cannot or has never
had.a significant impact on the fluctuation of real output,
investment, or consumption. Rather we subscribe to the
second interpretation of RBCanalyses as investigationsof
real. allocations under the assumption·· that, toagood
approximation, monetary policy shocks have played an
insignificant role in determining the behavior of real
variables."
14. These techniques of introducing money are closely
rel.ated to the money-in-utility-function (MIUF) approach.
The MIUF approach is criticized by some monetary theo-
rists as implicit theorizing because of its reliance on the
underlying model and its assumptions with implications
that might be contradictory to those of the final model (for
a critical discussion, see Kareken and Wallace (1980)).
15. However, there is a justifiable concern about im-
plementing this technique for a monetary economy. Ac-
cording to this methodology, one has to get estimates of
the deep parameters governing preferences and technol-
ogy that are invariant with respect to any type of monetary
policy shifts and interventions. It might be especially
difficult to obtain or isolate such information about the
parameter values of the underlying transaction technol-
ogy from data.
16. In both the Huh economy and the Cooley-Hansen
economy (discussed below) changes in the steady state
inflation rate have effects that are the opposite of the
"Tobin effect." The Tobin effect implies a positive correla-
tion between the steady state inflation rate and the capital
stock. It arises as a result of portfolio substitution: an
increase in the rate of inflation, for instance, lowersthe rate
of return on money and causes individuals to substitute
into physical capital. By contrast, in a cash-in-advance
model, an increase in inflation makes activities that
require the use of money (purchases of consumption
goods) less attractive relative to other activities (leisure),
because of the decrease in the purchasing power of
money holdings due to inflation. For more discussion see
Stockman (1981) and Lucas (1987).
17. It is important to realize that a cash-in-advance con-
straint imposes some significant restrictions on the model
structure. The first is the exogeneity of the length of the
period defined in the economy, which was first pointed out
by Harris (1980). Cash balance holding in a cash-in-
advance economy is analogous to a hot potato, where the
temperature of the potato measures the rate of inflation in
the economy. The higher the inflation (Le., the hotter the
potato), the faster one wants to dispose of it. In this
economy, the length of each period is defined as the time
for which money is held, and, therefore, the velocity of
money is defined to be one. Consequently, the length of
the time period might change as the purchasing power of
cash holdings varies due to changes in monetary policy,
that is, as the economy moves between high and low
inflation.
The next restriction is not unrelated to the first. The
exogenous grouping of goods in terms of cash versus
15noncash goods is too restrictive, As the prevailing inflation
rate changes, the scope of transactions involving cash
versus noncash (credit or barter) is very likely to shift.
18, These restrictions lead to confusion about aggregate
and relative price changes, and therefore cause money to
have real effects,
19, Monetary misperception has been regarded as a
potentially important source of monetary non-neutrality
not only by the economists in the Lucas-Barro tradition,
but also by some current practitioners of RBC theories
(see the earlier discussion of the Cooley-Hansen paper),
Thus, the test by Kydland has added significance, How-
ever, in an attempt to isolate the effect of money through
informational confusion, a stringent neutrality is imposed
onthe model economy, In the model economy, individuals
are paid in fiat currency (nominal wage), but it is unclear
how transactions of goods are consummated or what
happens to the individual money holdings in his "islands"
economy, Consequently, interpreting the noise compo-
nent of the observed nominal wage as a money or aggre-
gate price shock seems arbitrary,
20, Imrohoroglu and Prescott (1990) is intended to exam-
ine some of these issues,
21. For example, Stadler (1990) obtains a strong non-
neutrality result by incorporating atemporarily fixed nomi-
nal wage contract feature in an otherwise real model. We
regard the assumed fixity too extreme and implausible,
but it is one demonstration that such complications may
alter the usual "effectively neutral money" results,
22, Greenwood, Hercowitz, and Huffman (1988) analyze
an· RBC model in which the rate of capital utilization is
endogenous,
23, See Lucas (1976).
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